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trial courts much help in evaluating the constitutionality of any potential
replacement legislation in terms of the right of access to the courts. It never
has been clear in Missouri what the substance of that right is, nor how far
its extends. Gaertner clarifies those questions only to the extent that the
specific terms of chapter 538 are now known to be unacceptable. The decision does, however, put the draftsmen of any future legislation on notice
that the Missouri Supreme Court considers access to the courts to be a very
substantial right. Any forthcoming attempt to legislatively abate the medical malpractice crisis must reflect that consideration.
MARTIN

M.

LORING

CRIMINAL LAW-FELONY-MURDER RESULTS
FROM THE SHOOTING OF ONE BYSTANDER
BY ANOTHER
State v. Moore'
Brian Keith Moore, a would-be robber, was convicted of first degree
murder when a bystander shot another bystander. On July 28, 1975, Moore,
accompanied by two others, entered a tavern in St. Louis. Moore displayd
his shotgun and announced a holdup. When a customer in the tavern,
Albert Williams, drew his pistol, one of Moore's accomplices fired at Williams. In the ensuing gunfight, two other customers were wounded. It
was later discovered that the wounds suffered by one of the customers,
Lawrence Meadows, were fatal. Meadows had been shot twice in the head,
the fatal bullet coming from the pistol of Williams, the customer who had
tried to thwart the robbery.
Two days later Moore was arrested in connection with the attempted
robbery and the homicide. He was eventually convicted of first degree
murder and attempted robbery. After affirming the robbery conviction,
the Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court for consideration of the first degree murder convic2
tion.
On appeal Moore contended that Missouri's first degree murder
1. 580 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
2. In his appeal Moore made three allegations of trial error other than the
one based on felony-murder. He alleged that the trial court erred (1) in failing
to discharge him because his warrantless arrest was without probable cause, (2)
in failing to suppress certain evidence and identification testimony allegedly
procured by illegal means, and (3) in failing to instruct the jury on second degree murder and manslaughter. These allegations were dismissed by the court
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statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. section 559.010,3 did not cover the situation where
the act of homicide was not that of the accused. 4 The statute provided that:
Every murder which shall be committed by means of poison, or
by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing and every homicide which shall be committed
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, or mayhem, shall be deemed murder in the first
degree. 5
Clearly then, under the Missouri statute, when a murder is committed
during one of the enumerated felonies, the felon can be convicted of first
degree murder. Such a conviction is generally termed "felony-murder."
In deciding the case, the court addressed the question of whether
"the felony-murder rule [first degree murder] applies to the circumstances... where the evidence dearly indicates that the fatal shot was not
fired by the appellant or an accomplice but by a bystander attempting to
thwart the robbery." 6 In a unanimous opinion the court held that the rule
did apply in this case and affirmed the first degree murder conviction.
The most important factor considered in deciding this issue was "whether
the death was the natural and proximate result of the acts of the appellant
or of an accomplice." 7 The court relaxed its position somewhat by stating
that "an independent intervening cause might relieve appellant of criminal
responsibility for the killing."8 No intervening cause was attendant, however, since Williams' act of drawing his pistol was provoked by the attempted robbery, and the shot fired by one of the felons provoked Williams' return fire which caused the death of Meadows.
By imposing liability on Moore for the acts of a bystander, the court
expressly overruled two of its earlier decisions: State v. Glenn 9 and State
v. Majors.10 The facts in Majors were almost indistinguishable from those
in Moore. In Majors, the felons were would-be robbers who entered a room
in which the occupants were gambling. A bystander pulled his gun, and
the ensuing gunfight resulted in the death of one of the gamblers. The
evidence was not clear as to who fired the fatal bullet. In reversing
Majors' conviction for the murder of this bystander, the court stated that
of appeals and the Missouri Supreme Court adopted verbatim the court of appeals' opinion on these issues. The case was transferred by the court of appeals,
under Mo. R. Cius. P. 83.02, for the supreme court to consider Moore's fourth
allegation of error, the felony-murder issue.
3. In 1975, RSMo § 559.010 (1969) was repealed and replaced with § 559.007
which defined felony-murder as first degree murder. In 1977, § 559.007 was substantially revised and now appears as RSMo § 565.003 (1978). The current statute,
which was not in force and therefore not applied in the Moore case, is set out in
full in note 81 infra.
4. 580 S.W.2d at 751.
5. RSMo § 559.010 (1969).
6. 580 S.W.2d at 751
7. Id. at 752 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. 429 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
10. 237 S.W. 486 (Mo. 1922).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/7
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the instructions requested by the defendant had been a true statement of
the law and that it was error for the trial court to reject them. Those instructions stated: "The court instructs the jury that if you find and believe
from the evidence that the shot that killed [the victim] was not fired by
the defendant, or by someone with whom he was acting in concert, if any,
then you must find the defendant not guilty."l
In a 1968 Missouri Supreme Court decision, State v. Glenn,12 the
court again indicated that it required the fatal act to be that of the felons
rather than that of an innocent person. In that case a police officer was
killed while attempting to apprehend the defendant following a robbery.
There were no witnesses to the actual shooting of the policeman, and the
defendant alleged that the fatal bullet could have come from either the
victim's own gun or that of another police officer. On appeal Glenn complained that one of the instructions to the jury "did not require the jury
to find that defendant fired the fatal shot but only that the homicide occurred during the attempt to complete the robbery."' 13 In affirming the
defendant's conviction for first degree murder (felony-murder), the court
emphasized that although the instruction complained of did not expressly
require a finding that the defendant fired the fatal shot and that such an
express requirement would have been preferable, the instructions taken as
a whole did convey this requirement.
In support of its decision to overrule Majors and Glenn, the supreme
court in Moore stated, "In neither Majors nor Glenn do we find a statement of the rationale for the requirement that the fatal act be performed
by defendant or someone acting in concert with him."' 4 In addition, the
court emphasized that there has never been a requirement in Missouri
that the defendant himself commit the fatal act before liability could lie
under the felony-murder rule because "any person involved in the &underlying felony may be held accountable for every homicide committed in
the perpetration of the felony even though the fatal act was committed by
a co-felon."'I5
In Moore the court chose to follow the proximate cause theory of
felony-murder, a relatively recent approach in the historical development
of the doctrine. The English common law notion of felony-murder was
that if, while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a felony, the felon
killed someone, a conviction for murder could be sustained. Of course, the
additional conviction for murder made no difference with regard to the
degree of punishment because all felonies were capitally punished. 16
11. Id. at 486.
12. 429 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
13. Id. at 236.

14. 580 S.W.2d at 751.
15. Id. See also State v. Paxton, 453 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1970); State v. Messino, 325 Mo. 743, 30 S.W.2d 750 (1930); State v. Nasello, 325 Mo. 442, 30 S.W.2d
132 (1930); State v. Hart, 292 Mo. 74, 237 S.W. 473 (1922).
16. Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 51, 52
(1956).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
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The effect of the doctrine was generally "the imputation of a certain
state of mind, the mens rea regarded as essential to liability for murder, to
17
one who may or may not in fact have had that intention."' It was used
as a means of establishing the mens rea, not the actus reus of the homicide.18 Since the genesis of the felony-murder rule, two theories have developed with respect to whether the rule should be applicable to cases
where the lethal act was not that of a felon but that of a nonparticipant
in an attempt to thwart the felony. The first of these two rules, accepted
today in a majority of jurisdictions, is the agency theory. Under this theory
the homicidal act must be committed by the felon or a co-felon in furtherance of the felony and not by someone resisting the felony. This theory
was first espoused in an early Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Campbell.19 Campbell was a participant in a riot during which a nonparticipant was killed either by one of the rioters or by a soldier attempting to
disperse the crowd. In holding that the defendant could not be guilty
under felony-murder unless the shot -was fired by him or another participant
in the riot, the court stated, "No person can be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either actually or constructively his, and it cannot be his
act in either sense unless committed by his own hand or by someone
acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or pur2
pose." 20 Until approximately 1922, Campbell was consistently relied on '
in other jurisdictions as a basis for denying liability where the lethal act
22
was not that of a co-felon.
In the 1920s and 1930s, a new theory concerning possible liability
developed in some jurisdictions. It applied the tort theory of proximate
cause to the criminal concept of felony-murder. Stated broadly, the theory
stands for the following proposition: Where the felon reasonably could or
should have foreseen that the commission or attempt to commit the
17. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 50, 59 (1956).

18. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308
(1965); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 539 (1957); Note, 7 Loy.
CH. L.J. 529 (1979).
19. 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863).
20. Id. at 544.
21. Morris, supra note 17, at 57.

22. In Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888), the Illinois court
denied liability under felony-murder where a marshal killed a bystander while
attempting to prevent the commission of a felony. The court again denied criminal
liability in People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920), when there was
not sufficient proof to show whether the robbery victim was killed by a co-felon
or by some third person. The Kentucky Supreme Court cited Campbell in a
case where the victim of a robbery and assault killed a bystander. The court
reasoned that "to hold [the felons] responsible criminally for the accidental
death of a bystander, growing out of [the victim's] bad aim, would be carrying
the rule of criminal responsibility for the acts of others beyond all reason." Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 100, 88 S.W. 1085, 1086 (1905). This same principle was applied in State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924), in which

felony-murder was held not to apply when an assault victim killed a bystander.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/7
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contemplated felony would be likely to cause a situation in which another
would be exposed to danger at the hands of a nonparticipant, this crea23
tion of the situation is considered the proximate cause of that injury.
24
This theory was developed in an Illinois case, People v. Payne, where
the evidence showed that a robbery victim was killed either by one of
the co-felons or by another victim. That court reasoned that it should
have been anticipated that the robbery would meet with resistance "during which the victim might be shot either by himself or someone else in
attempting to prevent the robbery." 25 The proximate cause theory also
26
in which a
was used to find liability in Commonwealth v. Moyer
filling station attendant was killed during an attempted robbery when
caught in the cross fire between the robbers and the owner. The evidence
was not clear who fired the fatal bullet. That court stated:

It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to
hold that when a felon's attempt to commit robbery or burglary
sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been
within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he
should be held responsible for any death which by direct or2 7almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act.
Subsequent cases in other jurisdictions have been split, some following the traditional agency theory and some the proximate cause theory. The
trend, though, has been toward limiting the applicability of felony-murder
while the proximate cause theory is generally in disfavor. 28 In fact, although Pennsylvania expanded felony-murder under the proximate cause
theory in Commonweatlh v. Almedia,29 the court later limited Almedia
in Commonwealth v. Redline.30 Finally, the supreme court overruled Almedia and retained felony-murder within its traditional boundaries, the
agency theory, in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers.3 ' Many states
which now follow the proximate cause theory still rely on Almedia despite
its demise. Those states, other than Missouri, which have addressed the
question and have decided in favor of expanding the felony-murder rule
to include the lethal acts of non-felons presently include Florida,3 2 Illinois, 33

184

was
421
419

23. See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 210 (1950).
24. 359 111. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935).
25. Id. at 255, 194 N.E. at 543.
26. 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
27. Id. at 190-91, 53 A.2d at 741.
28. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 721 (2d ed. 1969); Note, 52 CH.-KENT L. REv.
(1975).
29. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
30. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
31. 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
32. Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955) (adopted Almedia before it
overturned).
33. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974), cert. denied,
U.S. 913 (1975); People v. Allen, 56 Ill. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544, cert. denied,
U.S. 865 (1974); People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935).
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36
35
and
a limited manner), Texas,
(in
Michigan, 34 Oklahoma
:
37
and New Mexico. 1S On the other hand, a
possibly Alabama
definite majority of the states which have considered the question have clearly restricted felony-murder to cases in which the act
of killing was that of either the felon or a co-felon in the
furtherance of the felony. These states include ArkansasA9 California, 0

34. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 580, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952), relied on the
now-overruled Pennsylvania case Commonwealth v. Almedia, 362 Pa. 596, 68
A.2d 595 (1949), to find a felon guilty of felony-murder when a policeman killed
another policeman. The court noted that Michigan's statute was based on Pennsylvania's and that Almedia and Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d
736 (1947), were an interpretation of that similar statute. This expansion of
felony-murder was reaffirmed in People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766
(1963). But see People v. Smith, 56 Mich. App. 560, 224 N.W.2d 676 (1974), in
which the appellate court reluctantly followed the supreme court's Podolski decision, pointing out that Podolski was based on Pennsylvania cases (Almedia and
Moyer) which had subsequently been overturned.
35. In Johnson v. State, 386 P.2d 336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963), a police officer was killed by another policeman but, in this case, the defendant had announced his intention to kill the police officer. In the ensuing gunfire, the police
officer was shot once by the defendant and once by a fellow policeman. Medical
testimony showed that the fatal bullet was from the policeman's gun. The holding was limited to the facts in that case, the court stressing that actual malice
was displayed by the defendant's announced intention and that his goal was
achieved.
36. In Miers v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 572, 251 S.W.2d 404 (1952), the
victim was killed in a struggle with the defendant over a gun. The court held
that the defendant was criminally liable even if the victim had accidently killed
himself. The court stated, "The whole question here is one of causal connection.
If the appellant here set in motion the cause which occasioned the death of deceased, we hold it to be a sound doctrine that he would be as culpable as if he had
done the deed with his own hands." 251 S.W.2d at 408.
37. Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182 (1905), may be implying that
it would expand felony-murder. This, however, was an unusual case because the
defendants were the sons of the man who fired the shot which killed the policeman.
The father was insane, and it was argued that the sons incited the father to shoot.
38. State v. Harison, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977). Although this case
involved a traditional case of felony-murder in which one of the felons accidentally killed the kidnap victim, the court stated in dicta, "[A] policeman who
shoots at an escaping robber but misses and kills an innocent bystander would be
considered a dependent, intervening force, and the robber would be criminally
liable for felony murder under this test." Id. at 442 n.1, 564 P.2d at 1324 n.l.
These dicta were limited two years later when the court held felony-murder did
not apply to a situation "where the victim of the crime kills a perpetrator." Jack589 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1979).
son v. State, 92 N.M. 461, _
39. In Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934), bank robbers
were held responsible for the death of a teller killed by a police officer. This,
however, was a case in which the felons held an innocent person before them as
a shield when escaping. These shield cases have been a traditional exception, even
in agency theory jurisdictions, because courts hold that using the person as a
shield demonstrates actual malice. The Wilson court specifically said that it agreed
with the principles of Campbell and Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88

S.W. 1085 (1905).

40. Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275
(1970), overruled on other grounds sub nom. People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539
P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975); People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365,
47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965), vacated, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); People v. Washington, 62
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Colorado,41 Kentucky, 42 Louisiana, 43 Massachusetts, 4 1' Nevada, 45 New Jer49
48
47
sey, 46 New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
The Missouri court, in deciding Moore, opted to follow the proximate cause theory and, in fact, seemed to ignore the majority rule completely. No mention was made of the agency theory of felony-murder.
Instead, the court relied on the Illinois line of cases, including a relatively
recent case, People v. Hickman.50 The facts in Hickman seem even less conducive to a holding of liability than do those in Moore. In Hickman, a
police officer was killed by another police officer who shot believing that
the figure he saw was an escaping burglar. Although one of the co-felons
had a gun in his possession when he was arrested, none of the felons ever
fired a shot, and there was no evidence that the defendant or any of the
other co-felons had a gun at the time. This case has been criticized as an
51
unreasonable extension of the felony-murder rule.
In Moore, the court also relied on two Michigan cases, People v. Podolski 52 and People v. Smith.53 Podolski relied on the now overruled
Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Almedia. Smith was an appellate
decision which indicated a desire to change the existing case law on the
Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965). California does not extend
felony-murder to cover the non-participant homicides, but the act may be murder
under another theory. See notes 63-67 and accompanying text infra.
41. Alvarez v. District Court, 186 Colo. 37, 525 P.2d 1131 (1974).
42. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905).
43. State v. Garner, 238 La. 563, 115 So. 2d 855 (1959). This court relied
on determinations of the question in other jurisdictions and an interpretation of
its own statute. The statute used the term "offender," and the court stated:
No mention is made therein that the "offender" is responsible for the
result of a self defensive act committed by the person attacked. No intimation is made that the "offender" stands in the shoes of the person
protecting his person and property with arms. We believe . . . that the
legislative intent in employing the word "offender" contemplated the
actual killer.
hd. at 586, 115 So. 2d at 864. The court also emphasized that doubt concerning
a statute is to be resolved in favor of the defendant.
44. The principles of Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541
(1863) were reaffirmed in Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d
308 (1965).
45. Sheriff v. Hicks, 89 Nev. 78, 506 P.2d 766 (1973).
46. State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 374 A.2d 20 (1977). After discussing the
pros and cons of the expansion of the felony-murder rule to include cases in
which the lethal act was not committed by one of the felons, the court chose to
follow the majority view. It stated, "[M]ost modem progressive thought in
criminal jurisprudence favors restriction rather than expansion of the felony murder rule." Id. at 217, 374 A.2d at 29.
47. People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960).
48. State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924), is one of the leading cases in the area and has been cited by numerous other courts in support of
the agency theory.
49. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
50. 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
51. Note, 52 CI-KENT L. REv. 184 (1975); Note, 7 Loy. U.L.J. 529 (1976).
52. 332 Mich. 580, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952).
53. 56 Mich. App. 560, 224 N.W.2d 676 (1974).
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subject but considered itself bound by the earlier supreme court decision
54
in that state.
Additional reliance was placed on one Texas 55 and one Oklahoma
case; both decisions followed the proximate cause theory. The Oklahoma
case, Johnson v. State,56 while purporting to limit the application of the
doctrine, applied it even though the felon did not fire the fatal shot himself since he had stated that he intended to kill the police officer;, his intent to murder was thereby expressed and not merely implied by the felony.
The Moore court did not enumerate any policy reasons for adopting
the proximate cause theory instead of the agency theory. At least one
court, however, has stated the policy justification that the felony-murder
rule would deter the commission of felonies. 57 This argument has not
gone unscathed:
It seems that the protection of society may be as effectively served
by increasing the penalty for the felony itself as by making application of the state's most severe penalty depend on such fortuitous
circumstances as the amount and nature of the resistance encountered in the perpetration of a felony. 58
Besides merely increasing the penalty for the felony, another possible
alternative to the felony-murder rule which probably would be a more effective deterrent would be to raise the penalty whenever a felony is accomplished by means of a deadly weapon. This would more appropriately increase the penalty because the felon chose to use a deadly weapon and
not merely because someone happened to resist with deadly force. For example, using a deadly weapon in the commission of a robbery raises it
from second to first degree robbery in Missouri. 50
In choosing the foreseeability approach to felony-murder, the Missouri Supreme Court went against most modern progressive thought which
favors restriction of the felony-murder rule. 60 As one court stated, "Tort
concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause have shallow relevance to
culpability for murder in the first degree. Gradations of criminal liability
54. See note 34 supra.
55. Miers v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 572, 251 S.W.2d 404 (1952). For a discussion of Miers, see note 36 supra.

56. 386 P.2d 336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963). For a discussion of Johnson, see
note 35 supra.
57. Commonwealth v. Almedia, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
58. Note, 71 HARv. L. RIv. 1565, 1566 (1958) (discussing Commonwealth v.
Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958)).
59. Under the Missouri statutes, a robbery accomplished by use or threatened
use of a dangerous instrument against any person or while armed with a deadly
weapon is robbery in the first degree. RSMo § 569.020 (1978). Robberies accomplished without the use of these weapons and/or the threatened use of a
dangerous instrument are only second degree robbery. RSMo § 569.030 (1978).
60. State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 224, 374 A.2d 20, 29 (1977); R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAw 721, 722 (2d ed. 1969); Ludwig, ForeseeableDeath in Felony Murder, 18 U. Prrr. L. R.v. 51, 52 (1956); Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration,
34 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 83, 97, 98 (1959); Note, 52 CHI-KENT L. Rxv. 184 (1975); Note,
9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. 9- PROC. 517, 518 (1975).
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should accord with degree of moral culpability for the actor's conduct." 61
Even as early as 1905, courts were pointing out the unfairness of any ex62
pansion of the rule.
If the court were determined to hold Moore responsible for the death
of the bystander, it could have done so without resorting to the felonymurder doctrine. Instead, it could have followed the unique approach
taken by California courts. California courts have adopted the agency
theory of felony-murder and have expressly rejected the proximate cause
theory, stating:
When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his accomplice but by his victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to
the robber, for the killing is not committed by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. It is not enough that
the killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen and that the robbery might therefore be regarded as a proximate cause of the killing.63
The court specifically found that felony-murder did not apply in these
cases, but allowed for the possibility of liability under a different theory:
Defendants who initiate gun battles may also be found guilty
of murder if their victims resist and kill. Under such circumstances, the defendant for a base, anti-social motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves
a high de64
gree of probability that it will result in death.
This exact situation occurred in People v. Gilbert6 5" when one of the cofelons was killed by a police officer. The felon who had initiated the gun
battle was held liable for the death of a co-felon. The conviction was affirmed not under the felony-murder doctrine, but under the theory that
the defendant's actual malice was displayed in his conscious disregard for
life. Of course, this theory too can be abused and liability extended
illogically.6 0 This theory has also been criticized as only another way of
07
stating the felony-murder doctrine.
In addition to these moral and policy questions, there also may be a
61. State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 226, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (1977).
62. For cases discussing this point, see note 22 supra.
63. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 442, 445 (1965) (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 782, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
65. 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
66. In Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr.
275 (1970), the defendant was waiting in the getaway car while his co-felons attempted to rob a store. The victim of the robbery shot and killed one of the
co-felons and the defendant was convicted for the murder. Although the felons
did not fire the first shot, the court held that the threats and nervous activity of
the two felons were sufficient provocation to be considered initiation of the gun
battle and would thereby qualify under the exception stated in People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965), and People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
67. Sheriff v. Hicks, 89 Nev. 78, 82, 506 P.2d 766, 768 (1973).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

9

1980]

MissouriRECENT
Law Review, Vol.
45, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 7
CASES

constitutional question involved in applying felony-murder to Moore; it
might violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Although the
United States Supreme Court has never granted certiorari to address the
question specifically applied to felony-murder, 68 it has addressed similar
questions. Even though the ex post facto clause is traditionally viewed as
only applying to legislative and not judicial actions, the Supreme Court
stated in Bouie v. City of Columbia, "If a state legislature is barred by the
Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State
Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same results by judicial construction." 69 This reasoning was used
in Boule to strike down a conviction for trespassing. In that case the statute, precise and narrow on its face, defined trespassing as entering another's property after being told not to enter. The state courts then expanded the statute to include the defendants' action of remaining on property, a restaurant, after being told to leave. The Supreme Court reversed
and stated:
[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute,
applied retroactively, operates precisely as an ex post facto law,
such as Article I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids. An ex post facto
law has been defined by this Court as one "that makes an action
done before the passing of the law, which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action," or "that aggravates a crime,
70
or makes it greater than it was, when committed."
An argument of this type was made by the appellant in United States
ex rel. Almedia v. Rundle.7 1 In denying habeas corpus the court noted
that this was not a case in which the courts, by interpreting the felonymurder statute to include the defendant's acts, had reversed a prior decision. It emphasized that at the time of Almedia's trial the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had never addressed the question and that it was the
function of the court to interpret exactly what was covered by a statute.72
In Moore, however, there was a prior Missouri Supreme Court decision defining the limits of the statute.7 3 It has been said:
Perhaps the easiest case [in which the courts have violated the
prohibition against ex post facto laws] is that in which a judicial
68. Certiorari has been denied consistently by the Supreme Court in cases
concerning nonparticipant felony-murder. See, e.g., People v. Hickman, 59 Ill.
2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975). Although certiorari was granted in People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 909 (1965), review was limited to other questions on appeal. 384 U.S. 985
(1966).
69. Bouje v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964).
70. Id. at 353 (emphasis in original).
71. 255 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Pa. 1966), affrd, 383 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 863 (1968).
72. Id. at 944.
73. State v. Majors, 237 S.W. 486 (Mo. 1922). See also State v. Glenn, 429
S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc 1968). Majors and Glenn are discussed in text accompanying notes 9-13 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/7
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decision subsequent to the defendant's conduct operates to his
detriment by overruling a prior decision which, if applied to the
defendant's case, would result in his acquittal. For example, the
later decision may . . . interpret a criminal statute as covering
74

conduct previously held to be outside the statute.

If the court in Moore had followed the lead of Glenn and Majors, the defendant could not have been convicted of murder because the lethal act
was not in furtherance of the crime. In so construing the statute to the
defendant's detriment, the Missouri Supreme Court has violated a tradition in Missouri case law. The cases have consistently held that, when
dealing with penal or criminal statutes, the statutes are "always strictly
construed, and can have no broader application than is warranted by its
plain and unambiguous terms." 75 Interpreting the statute to include homicides committed in an attempt to thwart, not perpetrate, the felony, clearly
is not "warranted by its plain and unambiguous terms." Doubts in criminal
cases concerning the interpretation of statutes have been traditionally resolved in favor of the defendant. 76 Missouri should follow the approach
used by Louisiana when it was recently confronted with a similar problem.
Basing its decision on prior Louisiana cases that required strict construction of criminal statutes, 77 the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to expand judicially its felony-murder statute to include nonparticipant lethal
acts. The court stated:
Reason dictates and justice demands that the public safety,
peace, and good order of the community should be insured at all
times. Normal people should be aware of the probable and natural consequences of their acts. The instant situation is deplorable; it is, however, a matter which addresses itself to the lawmakers. If we were to adhere to the theory advanced and contended
for by the State, we would be amending and enlarging the scope
of the statute involved rather than giving it a proper interpre78
tation and application.
In light of the general trend to restrict liability under the felonymurder doctrine and perhaps to abolish the rule completely, 79 the Missouri Supreme Court should reexamine its expansion of the rule to include the acts of nonparticipants.8 0 In passing the new Criminal Code, the
74. W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-r, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 94-95 (1972).
75. City of Charleston v. McCutcheon, 360 Mo. 157, 164, 227 S.W.2d 736,
738 (En Banc 1950).
76. Anthony v. Kaiser, 350 Mo. 748, 750, 169 S.W.2d 47, 48 (En Banc 1943).
77. State v. Gamer, 238 La. 563, 586, 115 So. 2d 855, 864 (1959).
78. Id. at 586-87, 115 So. 2d at 864 (emphasis added).
79. Felony-murder was abolished 20 years ago in England, the country from
which the United States adopted the concept. 5 8&6 Euz. 2, ch. 11 (1957). For
statements concerning the movement in favor of limiting or abolishing felonymurder, see authorities cited in note 60 supra.
80. It is interesting to note that five months before the supreme court decided Moore, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, had examined the
general trends and had, in a similar case, held differently than the supreme court

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

11

